Susan Lyons, Vice President of Design at DesignTex, a firm specializing in the design and manufacture of textiles for commercial interiors, wanted her firm’s next design to focus on sustainability. In February of 1991, she had helped launch a new line of fabrics called the Portfolio Collection, a design that evolved out of collaboration with famous architects, Aldo Rossi, Robert Venturi, and John Richard Meier. This collection was aesthetically innovative. Lyons wanted the next line to be about more than aesthetics; she wanted it to embody an issue.
Environmental responsibility seemed like a perfect choice. From a marketing standpoint, "green" design and manufacture were hot topics in the trade literature and she had been receiving inquiries from customers about how environmentally responsible DesignTex's products were.
But her desire to pursue an environmental agenda was not simply the result of customer demand. Ms. Lyons said she was raised not to waste. Her mother remembered the depression and "put her money where her mouth was before it was hip to do so", teaching her children to recycle and compost. She even rinsed out and re-used plastic bags! These values stayed with Lyons, who looked for an opportunity to apply them in the textile industry.
This new product line, thought Lyons, could maintain DesignTex's leadership in the commercial-fabrics design market. DesignTex was also a member of the Steelcase Design Partnership, a collection of design industries purchased in 1989 by Steelcase, a giant corporation located in Grand Rapids, Michigan, that manufactured office furniture and supplies. Steelcase formed this partnership to capture a market that otherwise eluded the firm. Although the company was able to mass-produce profitably, it was not responsive to customers such as architects, who demanded specialty or custom designs. Small, nimble and entrepreneurial companies were able to meet the demands of this growing market better than Steelcase, and DesignTex was such a company.
In order to maintain DesignTex's ability to respond to the rapidly-changing, custom design market, Steelcase permitted DesignTex's management to operate autonomously. In fact, as a fabric supplier, DesignTex sometimes competed against Steelcase for contracts. Steelcase typically brought in DesignTex as a consultant, however, in matters involving specialty fabrics design. Susan Lyons summarized the relationship, "DesignTex is very profitable, and Steelcase receives a large amount of money from DesignTex's operation with no oversight, so Steelcase is happy to let DesignTex do its own thing. However, this situation could change if DesignTex's profitability began to decline." By taking the lead in the market for ’green’ products, Lyons hoped DesignTex would maintain its autonomy.
Note here the mixture of motives that are often seen as separate: the desire for market leadership coincides with the desire to create a better world. There is a well-established market for ‘green’ products, exemplified by catalogues like Seventh Generation. But Lyons would be selling her new line in a furniture- fabric market that did not have a ‘green niche’. Lyons knew she "couldn’t sacrifice anything for green agenda"; the next Portfolio collection had to be as beautiful and durable as the last.
To launch her project, Lyons began surveying the trade literature, contacted yarn spinners who claimed to be environmentally "correct," and paid attention to competitors who were also attempting to enter this market. She contacted some of the 40 different mills that contracted with DesignTex as suppliers. In December of 1992 she became interested in a sample of a fabric product line called Climatex. Mr. Albin Kaelin, Managing Director of Rohner Textil AG, a mill located in Switzerland, sent Lyons a sample.
Kaelin had been thinking about environmental design for years. His backyard is an organic garden. On a recent visit, Kaelin took me to the summit of Santis, a nearby peak, to admire the Alps stretching away forever. I went to college in Los Angeles and recognized the ozone haze that smeared our view. Los Angeles is surrounded by impressive mountains, but they can often be barely discerned, great gray lumps in a brown haze of nitrous oxide. What would the Swiss Alps look like from here in twenty years, I wondered? You didn't need to be the mythical 'rocket scientist' to realize something had to be done.
Rohner Textil is situated in a corner of Switzerland a few hundred yards from the Rhine, which in turn empties into nearby Lake Constance. Rohner Textil was dyeing much of the fabric in house. This meant that it had to treat and dispose of its waste water, which, if not properly treated, posed a potential threat to the largest drinking water reservoir in Europe. The cost of meeting strict Swiss regulatory requirements was high. Therefore, Kaelin had to think about environmental responsibility.
The Rohner mill was the smallest component of a much larger enterprise: Forster-Rohner, a company that consisted of five European textile mills with specialties that ranged from socks to jerseys and embroidery. Embroidery was their largest segment, consisting of over fifty percent of Forster-Rohner's manufactures. In addition, the embroidery output was the largest in Europe.
Rohner Textil had a total of thirty employees. In order for such a small company to remain useful to the larger enterprise and be competitive in general, it needed to remain at the cutting edge of providing the most creative and high quality upholstery fabrics, like DesignTex. The mill needed to be able to adjust quickly to the demands of customers who wanted small lots of unique upholstery designs. They also needed to remain price-competitive, and Kaelin wanted to increase production.
One of the first steps was to improve their looms to high-speed, Jacquard looms in 1987. These new looms would have produced more noise and vibrations than the old looms. This was a major problem, since the mill long had been part of a residential neighborhood in Heerbrugg. The building had been constructed in 1912, and the former parent company of Rohner Textil, Jacob Rohner AG had occupied it since 1947. A kindergarten stood across the street to the east, and houses surrounded the mill less than ten yards away on the other three sides. The vibrations from the new looms would disrupt the neighborhood and force regulators to eliminate the evening shift.
Moving the mill was not a viable option. Land in the region was prohibitively expensive, and the mill’s current location was right next to the parent company, facilitating communication and cooperation.
Kaelin thus proposed to construct a special, independently-suspended floor on which all of the weaving equipment would be mounted. The floor would be designed to dampen the noise and vibrations. Kaelin succeeded in convincing Rohner to provide the necessary capital for the improvements. The new floor made the mill quieter than before the new looms were installed, and the looms increased flexibility, product quality and speed of production. With this new equipment, Rohner Textil was the first upholstery fabric weaver in the world to be able to produce fabrics with sixteen different colors in the weft, or crosswise, yarn. This ability permitted Rohner Textil’s designers to create fabrics with richer, more complex and more beautiful color patterns. Kaelin showed that one could increase production and improve product quality without compromising one’s ethical obligations toward the surrounding community.
An additional factor made Kaelin sensitive to environmental issues: it was expensive to dispose of his waste selvages. As the fabric came off of the loom the edges were cut to a uniform length and were sewn to secure the edge. Additionally, some fabric at the beginning and end of the fabric needed trimming to the proper length. These end-trimmings are the selvages, and they had to be disposed of carefully, because they were considered too toxic to put in a landfill. Some of the selvages were burned in the regional incinerator to generate electricity. The air pollutants were scrubbed before being released into the environment. This disposal procedure was very expensive. Overall, the waste selvages consisted of about thirty percent of the total environmental costs at Rohner Textil.
This cost was an extra burden for a company such as Rohner Textil which processed smaller lots of fabrics. For instance, Rohner might process a sixty-meter order for a fabric from which one meter of waste and selvages was generated. A company which processed larger orders might generate 2.5 meters of waste selvage for a 240 meter order. This meant that it was easier to distribute the disposal cost of the selvages to customers who ordered a larger lot size than those who ordered a smaller size.
In 1989, Kaelin realized that the only way to decrease these disposal costs was to pursue a more environmentally sustainable agenda. By late 1992 the mill had received certification by the German-based association, Eco-Tex. The institute, concerned with human ecology issues, tested Climatex for pH value, content of free and partially releasable formaldehyde, residues of heavy metals, residues of pesticides, Pentachorophenole (PCP)content, carcinogenic compounds, and color fastness. Having passed these tests, Climatex could bear the Eco-Tex trademark and was certified as containing no chemicals harmful to human beings and allergy-free. The process by which the material was manufactured was also free from harmful chemicals.
Such an approval constituted one of the most stringent environmental tests that could be performed on textiles at the time. This approval was an important step for Albin Kaelin and Rohner Textil; however, they had only slightly reduced their disposal costs. The tests did not certify that the products were completely ecologically safe outside the human sphere. Plants, domestic animals, wildlife, and ecosystems could be harmed potentially by the chemicals used in Climatex.
Here we return to one of the central ethical dilemmas of the environmental movement. Do we adopt what Carolyn Merchant calls an ecocentric view, in which ecosystems ought to be preserved for their own sake? Or do we adopt a homocentric view, in which the primary goal of environmental sustainabilility is to preserve human welfare? Eco-Tex standards were designed from a homocentric perspective, and Climatex met them. But one would have to do additional testing to be certain Climatex was also safe for the eco-system.
Susan Lyons asked Kaelin whether Climatex could be recycled. He responded that because Climatex was a blend of wool, ramie and polyester, no recycling was possible. Wool could potentially be recycled, if it were not treated with synthetics or dyes that made this impossible; ramie was a nettle and therefore also potentially recyclable. But when these two natural materials were mixed with a synthetic like polyester, they could not be recycled. In addition, recycling any commercial fabrics was questionable, because they were typically glued as upholstery, and the glue itself made recycling difficult.
But since the fabric was created without any chemical treatments, Kaelin pointed out that "...the yarn in the fabric can be burned without any damaging chemical reaction." He explained that the fabric released a large amount of energy when burned, and he proposed using this energy in the operation of the mill.
By the middle of 1993, Susan Lyons had several options to consider for an environmental design in addition to Climatex. One of the obvious ones was organic cotton. But in order to get a full range of colors, the cotton had to be treated with chemicals, and required dyes that might or might not be safe from either a human or environmental standpoint. Paradoxically, the consequence was that organic cotton, as usually treated, could neither be recycled nor composted. Patagonia had gotten around this problem by using natural dyes, but the range of colors was limited. The Esprit Clothing Company had also put out a promising line of clothing based on organic cotton. Lyons contacted Esprit, but this company’s designers felt uncomfortable with a collaboration that would take them into the commercial-fabric area. In general, cotton was a better fabric for garments than for furniture, which needed materials like worsted wool that could wear better under constant use.
An alternative solution using cotton was provided by Sally Fox, who spent a summer working as a hand-spinner for a cotton breeder and fell in love with the natural brown shades of cotton. Fox decided to try breeding natural cotton in different colors, strengthening the natural fiber so it could be spun directly without chemical treatment. The result was a natural cotton that needed no chemical processing. Furthermore, she was able to grow it organically, without pesticides. Potentially, it could end up being cheaper than commercial cotton, because of the high cost of treating and dyeing.
Foxfiber was another alternative for Susan Lyons, but again, it came in a limited variety of colors--Sally Fox was able to make shades like mocha brown and sage, but not the variety of colors furniture designers typically expect. Furthermore, the Foxfiber colors tended to fade. Washing would bring them back on garments, but furniture fabric could not be regularly washed in this way. Lyons wanted to make an environmental statement without sacrificing the full range of aesthetic possibilities.
Polyethylene Terephaltate (PET) yarn was another option. This yarn was made from recycled Coca-Cola bottles. Again, dyeing options appeared to be limited, though a range of colors was possible. Furthermore, what dyes there were contained environmentally ‘unfriendly’ chemicals. This meant that although PET was made by recycling, it could not be recycled itself. Finally, the suppliers were oriented towards apparel, not contract textiles of the sort used in furniture. Still, it told a good story about the virtues of recycling and had potential as a furniture fabric.
From a cost standpoint, Susan Lyons saw the options as relatively equivalent. From the standpoint of availability, Climatex had an edge because she knew Kaelin and trusted him to deliver. From the standpoint of aesthetics, organic cotton might have the greatest range, with Climatex PET and Foxfiber having more limited options, although in every case, it might be possible to work with designers to expand the available colors.
Which of these options would be best, if one put environmental sustainability first? In order to answer this question, Susan Lyons had to decide what environmental sustainability meant. Was being organic most important? If so, Foxfiber looked best. But what about waste? PET was designed to encourage recycling. On the other hand, Climatex could be used for fuel, thereby saving energy. Was saving energy the main issue? Everywhere she looked, Lyons saw trade-offs, and no obvious way to decide among them.
Lyons needed help deciding what counted as environmentally sustainable. The mental model behind the Portfilio Collection involved not only building a new fabric line around a theme, but also hiring a ‘high practitioner’ to guide development of the line. One name stood out from all the rest in the environmental area, as far as Lyons was concerned.
In section 4.4.1, we presented an overview of McDonough’s philosophy, in conjunction with his colleague Paul Hawkens. Like Susan Lyons, McDonough's concern for the natural environment began during his childhood. He was born in Tokyo and lived for a time in Hong Kong. It was his time in the Far East that opened McDonough’s eyes to the limits on water, food, and energy. He recalls that at his first school in the United States, his peers thought he was eccentric for shutting off dripping water and urging others to take quick showers . Even though McDonough was the son of a Seagram’s executive, his family had instilled a message similar to the one Lyons got from her mother. Nature abhors waste.
Susan Lyons knew McDonough’s reputation as the world’s foremost environmental architect. His architectural firm had created sustainable designs for a Wal-Mart store in Lawrence, Kansas, a daycare center for children in Frankfurt that allowed the children to manage the temperature through the use of shades and windows. He and Michael Braungart, one of the founders of Greenpeace (see 4.8.4 below) had written the Hannover Principles for the World’s Fair in 2000, "a set of maxims that encourage the design professions to take sustainability into consideration. They are descriptive of a way of thinking, not prescriptions or requirements" . These principles included eliminating the concept of waste and relying on natural energy flows and emphasized the interdependence of humanity and nature.
In October of 1993, Lyons and McDonough met. Reflecting on the meeting, Lyons said, "Two key principles hit home really hard, the idea that waste equals food and the idea of a cradle-to-cradle design, not a cradle-to-grave design." According to McDonough, in order to meet the waste equals food and cradle-to-cradle design criteria, the product had to be able either (1) to compost completely and safely, thereby becoming food for other organisms or (2) for all of its constituent materials to become raw material for another industrial product. Furthermore, one should not mix these two alternatives, or one would end up with a product that could be used neither as food for organisms nor raw materials for technology. McDonough was explicit: "I want a product free of mutagens, carcinogens, bioaccumulative and persistent toxins, heavy metals and endocrine disrupters". He described this method of design as "environmentally intelligent" because it involved having the foresight to know that poisoning the earth is not merely unfriendly, but unintelligent.
McDonough went to visit Kaelin in Heerbrugg, Switzerland shortly afterwards, in October 1993. Kaelin picked him up at the airport and on the way, was stunned by McDonough’s principle, "Waste equals food." He realized that his waste selvages problem could be eliminated if he pursued McDonough’s philosophy of zero emissions. If what was coming out of his factory was suitable to be food for biological cycles, he would have no disposal costs.
For both Lyons and Kaelin, McDonough’s waste equals food provoked moral imagination. Both saw that their prior mental models of environmental sustainability constituted only one of a set of possible views. Instead of trying to minimize wastes and work within a utilitarian system of trade-offs, one could work from a mental model based on the analogy of nature.
But coming up with a new mental model is not the same as making it work. Lyons and Kaelin had to reconsider all their options. According to McDonough, Climatex was no longer viable because it mixed the organic and technical nutrient cycles; you ended up with a product that could not be composted or recycled. PET had the same problem. According to McDonough, cotton was often raised in oppressive circumstances, so one would have to check carefully on how organic cotton was raised. Foxfiber would have fit McDonough’s criteria, but there was still the problem of colors.
The only way to meet all the design constraints was to come up with a new fabric. If Climatex could be altered to make the result compostable, then it would fit McDonough’s principles. Kaelin found that a mixture of wool and ramie would do the job. Wool was compostable, of course, and Ramie was a nettle, so it could be composted, too--if there was nothing in the dyes or the way the fabric was treated that would leave any toxic residue.
In order to be sure, every process used in the creation of the fabric would have to be thoroughly inspected and certified. McDonough suggested that his close colleague, Dr. Michael Braungart of the Environmental Protection Encouragement Agency (EPEA) in Germany, could do this. In the 1970s, Braungart was inspired by the ideas put forth by the Club of Rome on waste disposal. He obtained a degree in Chemical Engineering because he saw this kind of expertise as a way of having maximum impact in this area. He met and married Monika Griefhahn, the founder of Greenpeace, and Braungart became the head of Greenpeace’s chemistry department. Greenpeace adopted an adversarial position towards industry, protesting practices that produced waste.
An opportunity for partnership came when Bruangart lowered himself down a smokestack at Ciba Geigy, to stop production until the company’s emissions permits were renewed. The CEO Alex Krauer approached him and asked if they could work together, instead of fighting. Unlike Swanson and McKennon , who were never able to work togehter in the breast implant controversy, Braungart and Kraauer began a path to collaboration.
Bruanguart founded the EPEA in 1987 so he could consult with companies like Ciba Geigy on improving theirprocesses and improving their products . Originally, the word ‘Enforcement’ was in the EPEA’s title, but McDonough convinced Braungart to change it to ‘Encouragement’ and the two began an active partnership in the 1990s.
In 1989, Braungart created the Hamburg Environmental Institute, a non-profit organization that would complement the EPEA. One of the first proejects was a system for cleaning up waste water in developing countries. Sewage-contaminated water is a leading cause of disease, globally. The Institute’s system involved digging a series of settlement basins that were specifically designed to recycle fertilizer and depended on a tropical climate. These tanks gradually became ponds with algae, plants and fish. The idea was to create a system that could be used in the poorest areas because recycling fertilizer would greatly reduce the amount of new fertilizer needed. In some areas, this system could even produce biogasses that could be used for heating. In this cycle, waste becomes food and energy and water is purified.
Alexander Graham Bell based his mental model for a telephone on an analogy to the human ear. Similarly, I think this system is an embodiment of Braungart’s mental model. Instead of trying to install expensive new sewage systems in poor towns, the Institute created a technology based on an analogy to nature that would treat water while providing food and energy. One could apply a similar mental model to the elimination of waste in other technological systems.
Braungart traveled to Kaelin’s mill in December of 1993. His evaluation required him to examine all stages of the fabric-construction process. Because the mill was involved with the fabric weaving, he also inspected the mill's suppliers: farmers, yarn spinners, dyers and twisters. Yarn spinners created a cord of yarn/thread from the pieces of individual material fibers, such as wool. Yarn twisters take two or more cords of thread/yarn and twist them together, producing a much thicker and stronger piece of yarn. Dyers added the colors to the yarn. Finishers added chemicals to the finished weave to make it more durable, flame resistant, static resistant, and stain resistant, if such qualities were required.
By the end of January 1994 Albin Kaelin had created a new blend of ramie and wool that he called Climatex Lifecycle. Kaelin had sent Braungart all of the security datasheets and production details pertaining to the chemicals and dye substances used in the manufacturing of Climatex Lifecycle.
At the beginning of March 1994, Braungart gave Kaelin and Lyons bad news. The chemicals used in the dye materials did not meet the design protocol. Furthermore, questions involved in the manufacture of Climatex Lifecycle’s dye chemicals could not be answered by examining the security data sheets, even though they had passed the Eco-Tex standards. To make certain every element of this fabric could become part of a natural cycle, Braungart had to gain complete access to the manufacturing processes of the dye suppliers. Dye formulas are closely-guarded secrets. The dye companies would have to open their books to one of the leaders of Greenpeace, someone not exactly known for his sympathy to large corporations
More than a fabric was at stake, here--McDonough saw this design process as one of the first steps toward a second industrial revolution. Climatex Lifecycle was going to be an existence proof of this revolution, an embodiment of the design principles that would constitute an answer to those who said, "But this kind of uncompromising environmental protocol is impossible to implement."
Initially, it looked as though the cynics would be right. Kaelin contacted Rohner’s dye suppliers and asked them to cooperate with Braungart. By the end of March, Braungart had contacted over 60 chemical companies worldwide; none had agreed to open their books for his inspection.
Fortunately, Braungart and the EPEA had consulted with Ciba-Geigy in 1991 and 1992, advising them on how to improve their products. Braungart was able to persuade Ciba Geigy to open its books by arguing that if there were nothing toxic coming out of Ciba Geigy's factory, there would be nothing to regulate, and Ciba Geigy would not have to worry about unforeseen litigation due to long-term toxicity.
Here we come back to the issue we raised at the end of the Dow Corning section (4.7). Can a protocol like Braungart’s protect a company against future litigation and regulation? If so, it will have enormous economic as well as ethical benefits over the long run. But note the way in which implementation of this kind of protocol depends on a regulatory climate that encourages companies to innovate their way out of regulation.
Braungart conducted tests throughout April and May 1994 and found that only 16 out of the 1800 available dyes passed the protocol. Any color could be created from a combination of these 16 dyes, but when they were combined to create black, the resulting chemical reaction produced a chemical that would not pass the protocol. McDonough made a virtue out of this by comparing the Model T and Climatex Lifecycle: in the first industrial revolution, you could get any color as long as it was black, in the second, any color but black.
After overcoming this hurdle with the dye companies, DesignTex and Rohner made preparations to sell their product to a very large customer, Steelcase, which averaged a dominant 21 percent of the United States office furniture industry. Recall that Steelcase owned DesignTex, but gave it a great deal of independence--which meant that DesignTex could sell to Steelcase, or one of its competitors, or both.
Still a sale to Steelcase would be a big moral boost, as well as a financial milestone. Susan Lyons made arrangements to use the McDonough Collection fabric on Steelcase's award-winning Sensor chair, over one million of which had been sold from 1986 to 1990, and which was now considered an industry benchmark. This was an opportunity for the McDonough Collection to reach beyond any kind of ‘green niche’ market to a large customer base.
However, Steelcase introduced a new test required of all fabrics to be used on its furniture. Climatex Lifecycle had already passed or exceeded all International Standards Organization (ISO) and Swiss textile standards. The new Steelcase hurdle was not the result of a new standard, but a consequence of Steelcase's introducing robotics into its manufacturing processes. During the upholstering process for molded seating, robotic machinery gripped the fabric tightly and wrapped the fabric around the shells of chairs. The new test made sure that the fabric would not slip out of the robotic machinery.
Climatex Lifecycle failed to pass the new test: the ramie content of the fabric made the fabric unable to stretch in order to pass the new test. The test was ripping the fabric instead of stretching it. Lyons wrote to Kaelin, "Well, this is an adventure--everything failed on Steelcase... The reason for failure was cited as a lack of stretch in the filling direction. I am thinking that the ramie may be too rigid...".
At Rohner, Kaelin and the other textile technicians proceeded to make the fabric less rigid so that it could pass the new test. They tried a number of approaches, but the only ones that were successful involved adding chemicals to the fabric. The chemicals were applied after the fabric had been dyed and woven during the finishing process. The chemicals made the fabric more stretchable. The team came up with four different finishing chemicals that permitted the fabric to pass the Steelcase robot test.
All four chemicals were from Ciba Geigy, and were open to inspection by the EPEA. The EPEA approved only one, and the EPEA expressed its dissatisfaction with the addition of any chemicals. It could pass the EPEA protocols, but only with the caveat that Rohner would have to commit to eliminating it. Plus, the addition of the new finishing chemical meant that the fabric would now have to be re-tested according to all of the ISO and ACT standards.
K‰lin decided that it was more important to compromise the protocol just a little in order to have access to such a large market for the fabric. He decided to permit the use of the finishing chemical the EPEA had reluctantly approved and dedicate future efforts to eliminating it.
The economist and psychologist Herbert Simon has discussed how most administrators like Kaelin are more interested in satisfying than optimizing . Ron Giere has applied this approach to how scientists choose among alternate hypotheses . The McDonough/Braungart protocols focused on optimal environmental sustainability; instead of a set of utilitarian trade-offs between waste and economics, they seek no emissions. A satisficer in a similar situation might look at the set of alternatives that fulfill the minimum regulatory requirements, then rank them, and pick one.
Kaelin up until this point has been optimizing, searching for the absolute best solution. At this stage, in order to fulfill the demands of a customer, he satisfices, picking an alternative that fulfills the letter of the protocol. But he is not really a satisficer, because he remains committed to continuous improvement. The extra chemical was merely a stopgap measure to be used until Braungart, Kaelin and the rest of the team found something better.
The fabric was released to the public in a grand display at the Guggenheim Museum in New York City in June 1995. It won "Best of the Show" award in Chicago in June 1995 at the NEOCON convention, the largest annual gathering of textile design companies. The fabric became available to the DesignTex sales offices in late August 1995. The sales force learned about the fabric by watching a video presentation of McDonough and listening to an audio tape conversation of Susan Lyons. Both presentations underscored the importance of the design protocol in creating "environmentally intelligent" products.
Initial sales reports from DesignTex and Rohner were very positive. Swiss TV dedicated two reports, one seven minutes, the other three minutes long, to highlight the operations of the Rohner mill in October 1995 and in April 1996. The product was introduced to the European Market in January of 1996. It remains to be seen whether it will serve as a model for a ‘second industrial revolution’, as McDonough hopes, but it is serving to inspire other companies to develop new environmentally sustainable products following the McDonough/Braungart protocols.
One day, during the Spring of 1996, Kaelin noticed on the shelf a dye auxiliary container bearing a label not from Ciba Geigy, the company whose chemicals had been approved by the EPEA for Climatex Lifecycle yarn. Paul Fluckiger, dyemaster at Rohner Textil AG, decided to substitute one of the dye auxiliary chemicals a salesperson offered for one they were currently using in their compostable fabric line, Climatex Lifecycle. The salesperson argued his dye auxiliary auxiliary contained no chemicals harmful to the environment and was much less expensive than the one they were currently. Fluckinger knew the salesperson was right. If Rohner Textil used this dye, the fabric would still be compostable, and it would now be a little cheaper to make.
Mr. Fluckiger believed he acted within his authority. His autonomy had been reinforced by Kaelin, who believed that employees with appropriate expertise like Fluckinger should be given the authority to take measures to improve quality in every process and product. Fluckinger was literally a dye Master, having gone through an apprenticeship to learn his craft as well as a formal degree program. Kaelin's management style was to act as a collaborator with his top-level employees, turning them into a team of leaders.
Kaelin thought that Fluckinger's judgment was probably correct, meaning that he understood the overall ‘waste equals food’ mental model; however, the protocol, required that all decisions affecting the manufacture of the fabric be checked with the EPEA. This problem relates to Roger Schank’s classic distinction between schemata and scripts, which we discussed briefly in the section on moral imagination (4.3). To review, a mental model is a kind of schema, in that it is a way of representing one’s expectations about what will happen. ‘Waste equals food’ became a principle which Kaelin translated into a mental model of the design process, based on an analogy to nature, in which all wastes are food for other organisms.
But mental models alone are not sufficient. One needs plans, heuristics and what Schank calls scripts, borrowing from theater, where actions among players are scripted in advance. Similarly, Schank thought a lot of our everyday interactions were scripted.
Kaelin was concerned that Fluckiger had fallen back into the "old" way of thinking. But the evidence suggests that Fluckiger understood the overall mental model that guided the development of Climatex Lifecycle. What he had failed to internalize was a new script that required him to check with the EPEA before making any decisions.
In order to invent a fabric, Kaelin had to create a network of suppliers, consultants, and employees. Like most such networks, Climatex Lifecycle’s was operating in a hostile environment . The textile industry was in a recession, companies near Rohner Textil were going out of business, the EPEA was a new, experimental organization, DesignTex needed to have Steelcase as a customer. Every day presented new challenges that threatened to destabilize the network. Each decision that impacted the network had to be owned by others.
As Fluckiger predicted, when the EPEA inspected the new dye, they approved it. But Kaelin realized he had to work harder to communicate the delicate balance between autonomy and scripted actions. Climatex Lifecycle was the invention of a system of distributed and shared cognition. There were certainly individual heroes and champions, but no one of them could safely be labeled the inventor. Therefore, decisions had to be shared.
This case does illustrate how moral imagination can be translated into action. William McDonough supplied Susan Lyons and Albin Kaelin with new mental model for creating products, based on an analogy to natural systems. This mental model had to fall on fertile ground for it to succeed. Both Lyons and Kaelin were capable of working together with McDonough, Braungart and others to create a network that would actually produce the new fabric, surmounting obstacles like the dye company’s initial resistance and Steelcase’s new tests.
At a number of these points, there one would have expected a temptation to abandon the project, or at least postpone it, doing further research while sticking with safer alternatives like the original Climatex. But one senses no hesitation on the part of Lyons and Kaelin; they were willing to make some compromises, like adding a chemical to satisfy Steelcase’s tests, but never considered abandoning the project.
In part, this is because both Lyons and Kaelin were in an ‘innovate or die’ situation. DesignTex depends on a steady flow of new products for its existence, and Kaelin needed a way to survive the recession in the textile industry--he needed to create a new market, and be the leader in it. But their decision to innovate in the environmental direction was a fundamentally ethical one.
Lyons and Kaelin are heroes, but not in the classic Campbellian sense of the lone innovator who goes on a voyage of self-discovery and comes back with a discovery or invention that transforms the world. McDonough is more in this mold, with his inspiring vision. Instead, Lyons and Kaelin are both people who would be very uncomfortable with the label ‘hero’; they work by creating networks and sharing credit with others. Innovation demands charismatic entrepreneurs who seize the pulpit and ‘lead the charge’ towards change; it also demands entrepreneurs who work out of the limelight, helping create and maintain the networks that make change possible.
One of the greatest threats to such networks is the urge for each individual to claim more than her or his share of the credit. Mihaly Csikzentmihaly’s interviews of creative individuals included people like Hazel Henderson, founder of Citizens for Clean Air, and John W.Gardner, founder of Common Cause, who have devoted their lives to bringing about a better world . One of the major lessons they learned was that they had to share credit and indeed, eventually step out of the way and let their fledgling networks learn to operate without them. If Climatex Lifecycle continues to grow and expand as a model for new products, it will be because newcomers to the network feel they can both help make the world a better place and receive credit for doing so.
This page was last edited: Wednesday, July 14, 1999